April 15, 2026
Submitted via USTR Portal
The Honorable Jamieson Greer
United States Trade Representative
600 17th Street, NW
Office of the United States Trade Representative
Washington, DC 20508
RE: Docket No. USTR-2026-0067, Initiation of Section 301 Investigations: Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors
Dear Ambassador Greer,
On March 11, 2026, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) published a notice of initiation of investigations (USTR-2026-0067) under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to examine Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, which included a request for comments.
The Responsible Battery Coalition (RBC) is a coalition of companies, academics, and organizations committed to the responsible management of the batteries of today and tomorrow. Founded in 2017, The RBC was created to advance the responsible production, transport, sale, use, reuse, recycling, and resource recovery of transportation, industrial, and stationary batteries, as well as other energy storage devices. RBC’s diverse membership represents the entire battery lifecycle and includes the world’s leading battery manufacturers, recyclers, automotive fleet management, automotive retail, and original equipment manufacturers. For more information: https://www.responsiblebatterycoalition.org/.
RBC welcomes USTR’s investigation into structural excess capacity and production in certain manufacturing sectors, including batteries, as part of the Administration’s broader agenda to revitalize domestic manufacturing, create high-paying American jobs, and support broader national and energy security goals. The United States is home to many companies involved in the battery manufacturing industry or its supply chain across different chemistries, but they all face pressure from foreign competitors who can undercut American businesses through state-sponsored subsidies, policies, or other forms of support. Without a level playing field, American businesses will remain under constant threat from these competitors.
Key Points
Structural excess capacity—particularly when driven by non‑market policies such as direct subsidization, preferential financing, state ownership, production mandates, or artificially suppressed energy and input costs—distorts global manufacturing markets and burdens U.S. producers. Within the battery industry, we see clear evidence of this in countries like China, India, and Korea, but we are also concerned that this model could be adopted by other countries, such as Malaysia.
For U.S. battery manufacturers, these distortions are especially acute in direct competition for finished batteries, as well as in upstream and intermediate products critical to battery production, including refined metals, battery components, and related chemical inputs. Excess capacity untethered from market demand results in persistent oversupply and pricing that does not reflect true production costs or commercial risk. For finished batteries, this means companies can offer below-market prices for their products, often below U.S. manufacturers’ costs, putting U.S. battery manufacturers at a clear disadvantage.
This issue also extends to upstream and intermediate products in the battery supply chain. When these upstream and intermediate products are incorporated into batteries by companies that do not face true production costs, this creates a clear advantage over U.S.-based manufacturers and manufacturers in countries that pay fair market prices for their inputs. Artificially low prices also force other suppliers to close operations, which creates vulnerabilities and situations where no or limited alternatives exist. For the U.S., this displaces competitive U.S. production, suppresses investment returns, and discourages new or expanded domestic manufacturing capacity.
This is in direct contrast to situations where we have mutually beneficial trade arrangements, such as with Mexico and the European Union. In these places, we do not see overcapacity; instead, we partner with those countries to offer supply chain network flexibility, reducing costs for U.S. manufacturers.
These effects constitute a clear burden on U.S. commerce under Section 301, particularly when U.S. producers operate under fully market‑based conditions and comply with robust labor, safety, and environmental requirements.
The U.S. battery sector, particularly the lead‑acid battery industry, has built a highly efficient, closed‑loop recycling system that supports domestic jobs, reduces reliance on virgin critical mineral and other material imports, and advances U.S. energy security objectives. Structural excess capacity abroad threatens the economic foundation of this circular model.
When foreign producers operating under non‑market conditions flood global markets with artificially low‑priced materials or components, they weaken price signals that support investment in domestic recycling, secondary material recovery, and advanced processing technologies.
Similarly, excess recycling capacity in foreign countries weakens the North American circular economy for lead-acid batteries by siphoning off spent batteries, starving domestic recyclers of inputs, and, in turn, reducing the availability of North American-produced recycled materials for North American manufacturers to use as inputs for new batteries. These dynamics disadvantage North American producers that internalize compliance costs and adhere to strict permitting and operating standards for environmental- and labor-related aspects of the industry. This is particularly evident in countries such as China, Korea, India, Pakistan, and West Africa.
As a result, foreign excess capacity undermines U.S. policy goals related to critical mineral security, resilient domestic supply chains, and addressing trade imbalances—even where U.S. industry has demonstrated leadership and capability.
Beyond immediate pricing effects, structural excess capacity introduces systemic risk into U.S. supply chains. Production driven by state policy rather than market demand tends to generate abrupt export surges, price collapses, and capacity shutdowns, creating volatility that complicates long‑term planning and capital investment for U.S. manufacturers. This is particularly relevant to companies across the spectrum, from industry leaders to startups, who are interested in investing in the U.S. to create new manufacturing facilities or expand existing ones, but cannot reach a level of reasonable certainty about future market conditions to commit to the investment.
This volatility complicates efforts to reshore or nearshore the production of these inputs and also affects the production of inputs for the battery manufacturing supply chain. Similar to finished products that compete against domestically produced products, the supply chain for necessary inputs for the production process is often tied to countries with excess capacity or production, which makes it difficult to find alternatives because they can offer substantially lower prices or, in some cases, they can use those lower prices to squeeze out competition, resulting in even fewer alternatives.
Addressing these risks through targeted trade enforcement is consistent with broader U.S. objectives to strengthen supply chain resilience and reduce strategic dependencies.
RBC supports the use of Section 301 to address demonstrable non‑market practices that give rise to persistent structural excess capacity. Remedies should be carefully calibrated to target conduct that is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens U.S. commerce, while avoiding unintended consequences for U.S. manufacturers, reflecting the fact that there are existing market-based trade relationships with countries critical to sustaining domestic manufacturing. These countries should not be inadvertently penalized in any corrective actions resulting from this investigation, as this could cause severe supply chain disruptions for domestic manufacturers. One example of this is Mexico, which has become a critical piece of the supply chain for many U.S.-based manufacturers, including battery manufacturers, and we would recommend that any trade-related issues with Mexico be addressed through the upcoming joint review of the United States – Mexico - Canada Agreement (USMCA) to avoid any potential confusion caused by overlapping or conflicting guidance.
In particular, RBC encourages USTR to:
Finally, RBC emphasizes that trade enforcement and domestic industrial policy are mutually reinforcing. Federal incentives designed to expand U.S. manufacturing and processing capacity – such as the 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Tax Credit – cannot succeed over the long term if global markets remain distorted by structural excess capacity driven by non‑market practices.
Effective and well‑targeted Section 301 enforcement, in coordination with other ongoing Administration efforts, helps ensure that U.S. taxpayer‑supported investments are not undermined by unfair foreign competition and that U.S. manufacturers have the opportunity to compete on a level playing field.
Conclusion
RBC supports the Administration’s efforts to address structural excess capacity that distorts global manufacturing markets. Well‑calibrated Section 301 enforcement is essential to protecting U.S. producers, preserving high‑quality jobs, and ensuring that circular, recycling‑based supply chains can compete on a fair and sustainable basis. Addressing these practices will strengthen—not weaken—America’s manufacturing resurgence.
Thank you for your attention to this matter and for considering RBC’s perspective on this important issue. RBC welcomes the opportunity to engage with USTR as it continues its investigation. If you have questions, please do not hesitate to contact Steve Christensen, Executive Director of the Responsible Battery Coalition, at steve@responsiblebattery.org.
Respectfully submitted,
Steve Christensen
Executive Director
Responsible Battery Coalition
1455 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC, 20004
